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Racism has been the subject of considerable attention in recent years, and although many varieties of it have been identified and discussed, most of the discussions take insufficient account of the differences between the racial, ethnic, and national elements that play roles in it.​[1]​ Nonetheless, the talk of racism against members of ethnic and national groups is quite common and gives rise to misunderstandings and confusions about what racism is and the various forms it can take when these differences are not explored.​[2]​ 
	In this article, I explore racism in the contexts of race, ethnicity, and nationality in order to determine whether it makes sense in those contexts and, if it does, the differences and similarities between them. I argue that understandings of racism that pay insufficient attention to the differences that characterize racism arising from considerations of race, ethnicity, and nationality stand on the way of its eradication and prevention. I further argue that conceptions of race, ethnicity, and nationality that attempt to integrate them into mixed notions can make matters worse.  
	The article is divided into five sections. The first presents a general discussion of racism and its racial, ethnic, and national kinds. The second, third, and fourth examine in more depth racism based on race, racism based on ethnicity, and racism based on nationality. And the fifth presents some recent attempts to integrate race, ethnicity, and nationality that pay insufficient attention to their differences. 
	I. Racism and Its Kinds
Any discussion of racism and its kinds needs to begin with general conceptual formulations of “racism” and “racist.” Unfortunately, there is no consensus on how to understand these to date, so I propose to adopt a view I have defended elsewhere.​[3]​ Even though this view will not be acceptable to everyone, it should help to reveal some of the problems that may arise from the use of notions of racism and racist that do not take into account racial, ethnic, and national elements. For present purposes it is not necessary that we resolve the question concerning the ultimate nature of racism or racist; it is enough that we adopt a position that serves to raise and discuss the issues of concern explored here. 
Racism is an attitude toward individual members of a racial group, or toward the racial group as a whole, merely in virtue of the race, and a racist is someone who has this attitude. 
At least three important conditions that racism must satisfy are made explicit in this formula: (1) racism as an attitude; (2) racism is directed toward people in virtue of a group to which they belong; and (3) racism has to do with race. 
	The first condition stipulates that racism in general is best understood as an attitude that people may have. This attitude can in principle be understood negatively or positively. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, it makes sense to restrict the term ‘racism’ to the negative attitude because of the connotations the term has in ordinary language.​[4]​
	That racism is an attitude is significant, first, because attitudes are sources of actions and omissions. Most of what we do, or do not do, is prompted by the attitudes we have. It is also significant, second, in that attitudes may involve both rational and non-rational, and sometimes even irrational, elements. The non-rational has to do with what is independent of reason, but the irrational has to do with what goes against reason. This explains the cognitive and rational elements frequently at work in racists, insofar as those who have this attitude draw inferences about the objects of racism following logical procedures. At the same time, however, they are also affected by feelings and emotions, some of which may not go contrary to their perceptions and inferences, but some of which may do so.​[5]​ One may think one should not do something and yet do it nonetheless. Much of the irrationality of racism comes from the fact that it is not founded on criteria resulting from rational deliberation; often it is based on unsubstantiated opinions that rely on stereotypes or, worse, on ideological and uncritically accepted commitments.​[6]​ 
	The second condition stipulated by the formula is that racism is directed toward people, whether individually or as a group, because they are members of a group. People can elicit negative attitudes for a variety of reasons, but if a group to which they belong is not what prompts these attitudes, then these are not cases of racism.  For example, suppose that I am a racist with respect to Blacks and I meet someone, say John, who looks to me as if he belongs to the Black race. I judge him Black and immediately include him in the group of people toward whom I have a negative attitude. If I meet with some of my friends and they are talking about this person, I might say something disparaging about John, reflecting my racism toward Blacks. But one of my friends tells me that John is not Black, even though he looks to me as if he were. When this happens, and I am persuaded by my friend’s statement, I immediately correct my attitude and take this person out of the group of people toward whom I have a negative attitude. And the next time I meet John I act without prejudice toward him. This illustrates a case in which the negative attitude I have has nothing to do with John or even his qualities as an individual; rather, it has to do with the group to which I take him to belong, and which I have judged mistakenly. 
	This case is quite different from the case in which I meet a person and I develop a negative attitude toward him because he is loud or uncouth when judged according to my canons of etiquette or social sophistication. This is not a case of racism insofar as belonging to a group has nothing to do with my attitude; the source of the attitude is the individual, not the group.
	The third condition stipulates that racism is based on race. Here an important problem arises, because the concept of race is fluid, often including ethnic and national elements. Indeed, currently it is common to speak about racism in every case in which a group of people is thought to be oppressed by another, whether the oppression is based on race or not. Thus, for example, it has become commonplace in segments of the international community to accuse Israel of racism because of its policies toward Palestinians.​[7]​ But this use of ‘racism,’ even if it were justified, would make sense only if racism is taken to include ethnic and national elements, for neither Israelis nor Palestinians are races in any strict sense of the term. But it is not only the meaning of the term ‘racism’ that has been inflated. ‘Nationalism’ suffers a similar fate, being used sometimes racially and some times ethnically. Nazis spoke of the German nation as a race, for instance. Indeed, the mixing of race, ethnicity, and nationality has led some to speak of ethno-nationalism.​[8]​
	An important reason for the inflation of racism to include various phenomena related to ethnicity and nationality is that race, ethnicity, and nationality themselves often include elements from each other. Among the features that are sometimes regarded as racially defining are cultural traits, including religion and behavior, which often count as ethnic. A certain taste in music is used to characterize Blacks and certain kinds of food “Black.” The case of ethnicity is even more obvious in that certain ethnic groups include in the criteria for belonging to the group either race and racial markers, such as descent and phenotypes. It is common in the United States to think of Hispanics/Latinos as “darker” than non-Hispanics/Latinos – we are supposed to be “Brown.” And nations are generally identified with particular racial and ethnic properties. It is frequent among certain groups in the United States to think of citizens who do not speak English well, or are not members of the proverbial WASP group, as less than American.​[9]​  
	The inflation of the notion of racism does not imply that it is impossible to keep separate the notions of race, ethnicity, and nationality, as well as the corresponding notions of racism based on race, racism based on ethnicity, and racism based on nationality. Indeed, in what follows I try to do just this, in order to understand better the way in which racism works. I begin with racism based on race, which I shall call racial racism. 
	II. Racial Racism
I propose to understand  racial racism as the negative attitude that some individual persons or groups of persons have toward a racial group or its members in virtue of the race, and a racial racist is a person who has this attitude. The positive attitude is best regarded as racial recognition and not as a form of racism.​[10]​ 
	Race is a controversial notion over which there is no consensus. For present purposes, I adopt the view of it I present elsewhere and which I call the Genetic Common-Bundle View of race:​[11]​
A race is a sub-group of individual human beings who satisfy two conditions: (1) each member of the group is linked by descent to another member of the group who is in turn also linked by descent to at least some third member of the group; and (2) each member of the group has one or more physical properties that are regarded as (a) genetically transmittable, (b) generally associated with the group, and (c) perceptually perspicuous. 
Conceived in this way, race needs to be distinguished from raciality, which is the relational property of belonging to a racial group that characterizes members of a race, and a racial racist is a person who has a negative attitude toward persons of a race in virtue of the race. From this understanding of race and raciality, it follows that racial racism has to do with conditions of racial identity, which include descent and the properties associated with the race. Racial racism is a negative attitude of a person or group of persons against another group of persons or its members based on a certain descent and properties associated with the particular race of the group. Racial racism on the part of Whites against Blacks is this negative attitude based on a line of descent for Blacks and certain properties that are taken to be hereditary and characteristic of the race, such as skin color, bodily shapes, and so on. A White racist will have this attitude toward a Black person because she is related to some other Black person by descent, or because she has dark skin when compared with the skin color of a White person, or because she has a particular physical ability, or a consideration of these and other properties regarded as racially pertinent.  
	Racial racism, just like racism in general, need not be other-directed; it can be, and often is, self-directed. Racial self-hate is not uncommon, for one’s race can easily become the object of hate when it is the cause of oppression. By downgrading race and promoting racial prejudice, racists teach persons who become victims of racism to hate their own race and themselves for belonging to it. 
	Racial racism influences many dimensions of experience, for it goes well beyond the physical core of properties associated with a race. Of course, I shall refer briefly to eight that seem to be particularly significant. First, it crystalizes in views of the victim of racism as inferior and as having properties that are undesirable and objectionable. The list as we know in the case of Blacks is very long and we need only refer to the controversies concerning IQ for illustration. 
	Second, racial racism affects other views of the racist. This causes the racist to think of the victim of racism in particular negative ways, as immoral, promiscuous, lazy, stupid, and so on. What begins merely as a physical judgment affects other such areas as morality and culture. The victim of racism is viewed as unable to develop a sound moral point of view or as aesthetically inadequate.
	Third, in time racial racism creates a habit of perception that governs the perspective under which the racial racist considers the victims of racism. Victims of racial racism are always viewed under this negative umbrella, and all their accomplishments are fitted within this negative perspective. Even what, under different circumstances, would be thought to be good qualities, are seen as negative in some sense. The presumed physical abilities of Blacks are regarded as part of a less cerebral nature, for example. 
	Fourth, racial racism results in acts that adversely affect its victims. The presumed lower capacities of the victims preclude their participation in certain activities and positions – Blacks cannot be members of professions that require the kind of intelligence believed by racial racists that they do not have, and the presumed indolence of Native Americans is an obstacle to their holding jobs that require diligence. 
	Fifth, racial racism leads to a strengthening of the domination by racists over the victims of racism by justifying it. If the victims are considered inferior in various ways, this is used as a reason for putting racists in charge. The justification of the conquest and treatment of the native inhabitants of the Americas, as Ginés de Sepúlveda argued against Bartolomé de Las Casas, was that “Indians” were barbarians, inferior people that needed the protection and guidance of Spaniards. Similar arguments can be easily found in the writings of those who justified Black slavery. 
	Sixth, racial racism promotes the formulation of ideologies intended to support existing systems of advantage for racists and disadvantage for the victims of racism. These ideologies are sometimes backed up by the use of scientific or pseudo-scientific data. Culturally laden IQ tests are used to support the view that certain races are inferior in intellectual capacities to others and, therefore, justify social measures that promote the benefit of some members of society and keep others at a disadvantage.  
	Seventh, this in turn leads to the development of institutional systems of power and domination that preserve the disadvantageous condition of victims of racism. In the Spanish empire in the Americas, two of these were the system of encomiendas for “Indians” and slavery for Blacks. The encomienda was supposed to be a way of structuring society that would put “Indians” in the hands of those who were regarded as best able to direct them and bring them to salvation. It was presented as a measure “for the good of Indians.” In fact, it became a system of virtual slavery that survived the end of the Spanish empire and was still operational in some parts of Latin America well into the twentieth century. 
	Finally, when challenges to the views of racial racists put in peril the system that is supposed to keep order in society, these subjects are deemed justified in the suppression, by whatever means, of these challenges. Much genocide can be traced to this phenomenon, but closer to home, the willingness of the South to go to war to preserve slavery is a good reminder of the extremes to which racist societies are willing to go to maintain the advantages of racial racism for a dominant class. 	
	III. Ethnic Racism
Much of what has been said about racial racism applies, mutatis mutandis, to ethnic racism. I propose to understand ethnic racism as a negative attitude toward individual members of an ethnic group, or toward the ethnic group considered as a whole, merely in virtue of the ethnicity in question, and an ethnic racist is a person who has this attitude. The positive attitude is best described as ethnic pride and not a form of ethnic racism. 
	As in the case of race, there is no consensus on the best way to understand an ethnic group, so for present purposes I adopt the view I propose elsewhere:​[12]​  
An ethnos is a sub-group of individual humans belonging to many generations that is (1) organized as a family and composed of extended families, and (2) united through historical relations that produce properties that, in context, serve to identify the members of the group and to distinguish them from members of other groups. 
If this is an ethnos or ethnic group, ethnicity by contrast is the relational property of belonging that characterizes the members of a ethnic group and an ethnic racist is a person who has a negative attitude toward an ethnos qua the ethnos it is. Anglos are guilty of ethnic racism toward Hispanics/Latinos if they have a negative attitude toward them in virtue of their being Hispanics/Latinos. The reverse is also true: if some Hispanics/Latinos have a negative attitude toward Anglos qua Anglos, they are ethnic racists. 
	Ethnic racism can be easily confused with ethnocentrism, but they are different phenomena. In order to understand how, we need to distinguish between (1) ethnic pride/ethnic value, (2) ethnic racism, and (3) ethnocentrism. Ethnic pride/value is a positive attitude toward one’s ethnos or toward some other ethnos. The first attitude is better referred to as ethnic pride and the second as ethnic value, keeping in mind that ethnic pride is a version of ethnic value. If I have a positive attitude toward the Hispanic/Latino ethnos and I belong to it, this is a case of ethnic pride, and if I do not belong to it, then this is a case of ethnic value.​[13]​ 
	Ethnic racism is a negative attitude toward an ethnos and its members in virtue of the ethnos it is, whether the persons who have it belong or not to the ethnos in question. Whether I belong to the Hispanic/Latino ethnos, if I have a negative attitude toward it as a whole, or toward its members, because of the ethnos in question, then I am an ethnic racist.
	Ethnocentrism obtains when a person values something associated with the ethnos to which the person belongs and devalues other things belonging to other ethne that do not conform to what the person values in his or her ethnos. I am being ethnocentric when I think that eating with a fork is sophisticated and cultured, but eating with one’s hands or with chopsticks is uncouth. 
	Ethnocentrism refers to the attitude of those who judge other ethnic groups by their own ethnic standards – interpreted as the norm – resulting in a judgment of deviation or abnormality concerning those groups, who are thought to be substandard and to need uplifting or correction.​[14]​ If I judge English people by standards developed and applied to themselves by Hispanics/Latinos, I am being ethnocentric, and when the French judge English food to be unfit for human consumption, they are being ethnocentric, even if many of us agree with their judgment. ‘Ethnocentric’ is also used to characterize groups, societies, and cultures that have this kind of negative attitude and is applied to actions based on ethnocentric motives and to views resulting from ethnocentric attitudes. But ethnocentrism is quite different from ethnic racism. The object of ethnic racism is a person or a group of persons, and ethnic racism is an attitude prompted by the fact that the victim of racism is the group considered as a whole, or a person that belongs to that group. Ethnic racism is not about values or behaviors judged by ethnic standards. 
	An example of ethnic racism is the attitude that some members of the US population have toward Hispanics/Latinos in that they are predisposed against us because of properties they attribute to us and which they consider undesirable. Think of the so-called mañana philosophy associated with this ethnos.
	Ethnic racism, just like racism in general, need not be other-directed; it can be, and often is, self-directed. As with other racisms, the victims of ethnic racism can learn to hate themselves and their group, which in their case refers to their ethnicity and ethnos. 
	The foundations of ethnicity are located in a variety of historical relations and the properties to which they give rise in context. Among these, the most frequent involve race, nationality, territory, and certain aspects of culture such as language and religion. Therefore, ethnic racism toward a group is often based on racial characteristics, national origin, territory of provenance (whether immediate or distant), and cultural profile including language or religion. Someone may have a negative attitude toward Hispanics/Latinos because they are Black, non-White, or just racially mixed; because they are foreigners; because their place of provenance is not ultimately Europe; or because they are Roman Catholic or speak Spanish. 
	This is quite evident in ethnic racist discourse directed against Hispanics/Latinos. Members of this ethnic group are frequently described as having cultural properties that are objectionable: They are lazy, greasy, and dirty. They are also portrayed in racial terms as mixed, Black, or “Indian.” Most frequently in the United States, Hispanics/Latinos are regarded as foreigners, interlopers in the land, even if some of them descend from people who lived in what is now US territory long before the dominant Anglo-European group landed in North America.​[15]​ They are regarded as Mexican or Cuban, say, rather than “true” Americans, because their ancestors are supposed to have come from territories that are not the United States or Europe. Europe is considered part of the land where one is supposed to come from if one is to be a “true” American, although it does not usually include Iberia. The place of Iberia in Europe and in the mind of Anglo Americans has always been ambiguous. Frequently, Iberia is tacitly taken to be part of Africa, rather than Europe properly speaking. 
	The case of Jews is not entirely different from that of Hispanics/Latinos when it comes to ethnic racism. Consider that there is always someone talking about an “international conspiracy” of Jews; although increasingly less often, still some Americans do not consider Jews to be “true” Americans; and Jews have been caricatured as a race throughout history by a variety of other groups and as possessing very definite phenotypical properties.​[16]​  
	As with racial racism, ethnic racism manifests itself in a variety of ways. It can develop into a view, an ideology, a habit of perception or practice, institutions of power, and so on. Because a list of these was given earlier in the case of racial racism, and applies mutatis mutandis here also, there is no point in repeating it.  
	IV. National Racism
The term ‘national racism’ is not frequently found in discussions of racism or nationality. More common terms are ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism,’ but these do not refer to the same phenomenon. Let me propose that we understand national racism as a negative attitude toward individual members of a nation, or toward the nation as a whole, merely in virtue of the nationality, and a national racist is a person who has this attitude. And let me propose further that when this attitude is positive, we call it patriotism or nationalism, and should not be regarded as a form of racism.​[17]​ 
	As with the notions of race and ethnicity, the notion of nation is controversial. For present purposes, therefore, I adopt the view I have defended elsewhere:​[18]​  
A nation is a sub-group of individual humans who reside in a territory and, being free and informed, have the common political will to live under a system of laws that (1) aims to ensure justice and the common good, regulating their organization, interrelations, and governance, and (2) is not subordinated to any other system of laws within the territory in question. 		
From this notion of nation, it follows that nationality consists in the relational property of belonging to a nation that characterizes its members. And a national racist is someone who has a negative attitude toward a nation or its members merely in virtue of the nationality.​[19]​ 
	National racism can be wrong and undesirable in certain circumstances, whereas in others it may be right and desirable. It would be wrong to be anti-American because of the democratic laws of the United States, but it was certainly right to be anti-German when the German nation adopted laws that allowed the abuses committed during the period of National Socialism. A nation with imperialistic ambitions and motivated by ethnic or racial racism should arouse strong negative feelings and foment a strong negative attitude. But we must be careful not to confuse justified anti-nationalism with ethnic racism. To have negative attitudes toward the German nation at the time of World War II was perfectly justified, but to have a similar attitude toward Germans as an ethnic group at that, or any other, time is certainly unjustified, even if some of the properties of the German nation at the time were the result of contingent ethnic properties. 
	The foundations of nationality consist of a political will of a group of persons to live under a system of laws, which regulates the relations among the members of the group and the relations between the group and other groups. That ethnic and racial properties are often included among properties associated with particular nations means that nationalism and national value are often de facto directed toward racial and ethnic groups. Someone may have a negative nationalist attitude toward Nigerians because he thinks they are Black and he has a negative racist attitude toward Blacks. This is quite evident in negative nationalist discourse directed against African nations, in which they are portrayed as being Black and, as such, sharing in properties that are regarded negatively. Likewise, one may have a negative attitude toward Saudi Arabia because of its culture and religion, but this is an ethnic racism rather than a national racism insofar as the properties in question are not national but ethnic. 
	As with racist and ethnic racisms, national racism manifests itself in a variety of ways. It can develop into a view, an ideology, a habit of perception or practice, institutions of power, and so on. Because these have been discussed above already, they need not be repeated.  	
	V. Racial, Ethnic, and National Racisms
From what has been said, it should be clear that there are many similarities between racial, ethnic, and national racisms. All three are attitudes that persons have toward other persons in virtue of the groups to which they belong or toward the groups themselves because of what they are, and the logic of all three seems to be the same. In principle, there can be both negative and positive versions of each, and these are related in similar ways, although I have chosen to use the term ‘racism’ only for the negative versions of these phenomena in order to conform with general usage. Moreover, these negative attitudes are based, with reason or without it, on certain properties that the members of the groups are perceived to have. Considering these similarities, it is no wonder that it is easy to confuse them with each other. Moreover, as a result of the way they develop, and the close association in particular contexts, race, ethnicity, and nationality are frequently mixed and so are racisms based on them. Racism against Blacks can be ethnic, and racism against Puerto Ricans can be racial and national. Blacks are often the object of negative attitudes on the part of Whites because they have a particular accent when they speak, and Puerto Ricans can be the object of negative attitudes because they are Black or because they are perceived to belong to the Puerto Rican nation. However, there is still a more important reason for their confusion to which I already alluded above, namely, the mixing of race, ethnicity, and nationality. 
	Races, ethne, and nations arise in historical contexts in which groups of people are drawn together and separated from other groups. This drawing together and separation from others gives rise to ties among the members of the groups that in turn may come to characterize them as races, ethne, or nations. In these situations, it becomes difficult to separate the racial from the ethnic and the national, and in some cases matters become even more confusing because race itself, or at least some racial elements, may become part of ethne. The plasticity of ethnicity in particular allows as well for national elements to become part of ethnic identity. On the other hand, ethnic elements may become part of the background required for national identity because they involve values that are closely tied to the laws to which the members of the nation are subject. It often happens, for example, that nations restrict citizenship, and thus nationality, to members of certain ethnic groups. Indeed, during the Nazi years in Germany, Jews were stripped of German citizenship because they were considered not to belong to the German ethnos. 
	Finally, in some cases racial, ethnic, and national identities are nearly coextensional, for the same group may in principle simultaneously constitute a race, an ethnos, and a nation. If we ask somebody: Are you Mexican? This can be taken as a question about whether the person is a Mexican citizen, ethnically Mexican, or even racially Mexican. In these circumstances, it is difficult to keep the distinction between the three identities apart in that they are composed of the same, or almost the same, individual persons who, for all practical purposes, function as just one group.
	The obstacles to keep racial, ethnic, and national racisms separate are substantial, because often these phenomena are thoroughly mixed. Still, it pays to think of them as separate in particular because this allows us better to understand their various manifestations and intensity in particular circumstances. The understanding that the ethnic racism, so frequent on the part of some segments of the Anglo population in the United States against Hispanics/Latinos, has a racist element allows us to explain why it is that this attitude does not extend to some Hispanics/Latinos who look White. The difficulty of separating these forms of racism in particular circumstances has given rise to proposals for mixed categories, such as ethnic race. But others could be developed, such as racial ethnicity, ethnic nation, and national ethnicity, racial nation, and national race. 
	The attempts to eliminate the distinction between race and ethnicity come from two sides: On the side of race insofar as it is seen as including ethnic elements and therefore as fundamentally ethnic,​[20]​ and on the side of ethnicity insofar as this is taken to be so permeated with racial elements that it cannot be clearly separated from these.​[21]​ The first might be described as trying to substitute the notion of ethnic race for the notions of race and ethnicity. The second might be described as doing the same but with the notion of racial ethnicity.
	At least three important arguments can be given in support of the first. First, one may appeal to history. If one examines historical discussions of race, it is clear that race has always included ethnic elements. From the very beginning, racial divisions involved cultural divisions. Blacks have always been described as being different from Whites not only in terms of their physical and genetic characteristics, but also in terms of customs, attitudes, and achievements.​[22]​ This reflects the fact – so the argument goes – that the notion of race is inextricably mixed with ethnic elements.
	A second argument is factual. Here the point made is that the notion of race cannot be separated clearly from the notion of ethnicity because the physical phenotypes on which it is based cannot be easily distinguishable from cultural ones. Most phenotypes in fact are the result of both physical and environmental forces and racial phenotypes are notoriously so.​[23]​ This extends to such obvious ones as the color of one’s skin.
	The third argument is pragmatic and points out that every time one tries to separate the notion of race from the notion of ethnicity, race gets entangled with ethnicity, so it is counterproductive to keep trying. We need not do more here than refer to the case of the proposed change of name from ‘Black’ to ‘African American.’ This example indicates that in spite of the efforts of Blacks to develop a conception of themselves and an identity based on ethnicity, race gets into it.​[24]​
	The arguments in favor of the substitution of the notion of a racial ethnicity for the notions of ethnos and race follow along similar lines. The first argument points out that historical conceptions of ethnicity have always involved racial elements, such as physical phenotypes and descent.​[25]​ This is evident in that most opinions about “peoples” and the likes always involve race.
	The second argument points out that the notions of ethnicity cannot be separated from the notion of race because in fact that is how humans think. There is some research that indicates that we might be hardwired to think of our ethnicity as involving the sharing of an essence based on descent.​[26]​ If this is so, then there is very little sense in arguing for a conception of these notions that keeps them separate.
	Finally, pragmatically we see that when one tries to separate ethnicity from race, one usually fails, so there is no point in maintaining the effort. Here the case of Hispanics/Latinos is instructive, for Hispanics/Latinos are often regarded as a racial group in spite of the efforts of many to point out that this is inaccurate in that Hispanics/Latinos come in all kinds of races.​[27]​ So, why maintain a distinction that is generally ignored?
	 In short, race and ethnicity are regarded, intentionally or unintentionally, as hopelessly intertwined and not capable of distinction apart from each other. The phenomenon of the oreo, in which one speaks of the same person being Black on the outside (i.e., racially) and White in the inside (i.e., ethnically), indicates the difficulties of keeping separate these two notions. Indeed, it looks as if in this case the same terms are used racially and ethnically, and this suggests that in fact what we have are perhaps two sides of the same phenomenon. Race and ethnicity are simply two sides of the same coin. So much for the argument in favor of keeping race and ethnicity together.
	I do not find the effort to develop mixed notions of race, ethnicity, and nationality objectionable as long as the resulting categories serve the purpose of bringing an understanding of how race, ethnicity, and nationality function in certain societies. But the attempt to eliminate these categories in favor of mixed categories is ill conceived for at least two reasons. First, in order to understand mixes we need concepts of the elements that go into the mixes. To understand what an ethnic race is, we need to have notions of ethnicity and race, just as to understand what a mulatto is, we need to have notions of Black and White. Second, there are cases in which the unmixed categories function independently of the mixes.​[28]​ It is not difficult to find examples of ethnic racism unmixed with racial racism. This happens with Jews, for example, who have suffered discrimination and persecution even though their racial features have lacked uniformity.
	Those who argue in favor of categories that integrate race, ethnicity, and nationality base their reasoning on the brut fact that these categories are mixed in the mind of both racists and the victims of racism. So they argue that the situation requires that we employ mixed categories to reflect racism accurately and find appropriate solutions to it. In this they are right; an accurate description of racism should take into account that race, ethnicity, and nationality are frequently mixed in people’s minds. However, equally important is to recognize that racial, ethnic, and national racisms can and should be kept conceptually separate, because not every instance of racism targets race, ethnicity, or nationality. A nuanced approach to racism should take these differences into account and would more likely reflect accurately the situation than a simplistic approach.  
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